12.5 The Strengths of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare -- 12.6 The Limits of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare -- 12.7 Conclusions -- Author Biography -- References -- 13 Laboratory Biorisk Management as a Key Tool for Scientists to Understand Future Biological Threats and Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention 161 Mayra Ameneiros -- 13.1 History, Context and Current International Guidance -- 13.2 Biosafety and Biosecurity Awareness -- 13.3 The Role of Scientists: Tailored Biorisk Management Practices -- 13.4 Case Scenarios: Practical Examples -- 13.5 An Ongoing Cycle to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention -- Author Biography -- References -- 14 Examples of Biorisk Management National Regulatory Frameworks 173 Dana Perkins and Lela Bakanidze -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity in the US -- 14.3 Import-Export and Transportation of Infectious Substances in the US -- 14.4 Genetic Engineering and Dual-Use Oversight in the US -- 14.5 The Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity and Responsible Conduct in the US -- 14.6 The Biorisk Management National Regulatory Framework of Georgia -- 14.7 Conclusion -- Author Biography -- References -- 15 Lessons from ePPP Research and the COVID-19 Pandemic 189 Nariyoshi Shinomiya -- 15.1 Advances in Life Science and Technology and the Emergence of 'So-Called GOF Studies' to Create ePPPs -- 15.2 Controversy Surrounding GOF Studies on H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus -- 15.3 COVID-19 and GOF Studies on SARS-like Viruses -- 15.4 Ongoing Discussions at the NSABB and Governance by HHS -- 15.5 Future Governance of GOF Research and Prospects -- Author Biography -- References -- 16 The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines 201 Yang Xue -- 16.1 Relations Between the Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines -- 16.1.1 Commonality in International Soft Law -- 16.1.2 Commonality in Global Public Goods -- 16.1.3 Effective Multilateralism -- 16.2 BTWC Advances the Formulation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Responsible Scientific Research -- 16.2.1 Institutional Basis of BTWC for Responsible Scientific Research -- 16.2.2 BTWC Advances the Development of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Scientific Research -- 16.3 Constitution of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines: Ideas, Principles, Elements and Path Formation -- 16.3.1 Ideas -- 16.3.2 Principles -- 16.3.3 Path Formation -- 16.4 Future Discussion -- Author Biography -- References -- 17 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management 213 Yuhan Bao and Alonso Flores -- 17.1 Introduction: Scientists Engagement and Biorisk Management -- 17.2 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management at International Level: Case from IWG Assessment Framework -- 17.2.1 Building the Culture of Responsibility: The Key Elements and Approaches of Engaging Scientist in Biorisk Management -- 17.2.2 Improving the Culture of Responsibility: Engaging Scientist in the Assessment of Biorisk Management Systems -- 17.3 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in National Institutional Oversight: Case from the Netherlands -- 17.4 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in Community: Case from iGEM -- 17.4.1 Engaging Scientists Through iGEM Safety Rules Checklist and Safety Screening System -- 17.4.2 Engaging Scientists Through iGEM Human Practices Programme -- 17.5 Conclusion: How to Engage Scientists in Management of Biorisk and Other Emerging Fields -- Author Biography -- References -- 18 The Role of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use 225 Leifan Wang -- 18.1 The Dual-Use Concept and Concerns -- 18.2 Ethics as an Instrument on Dual-Use Governance -- 18.2.1 Ethics Promote Responsible Practices on Dual Use -- 18.2.2 Limitation of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use -- 18.3 Existing and Complementary Ethical Guidelines on Dual Use -- 18.4 Recent Dual-Use Scenarios -- 18.4.1 Synthetic Biology -- 18.4.2 Gene Editing -- 18.4.3 Neuroscience -- 18.4.4 Digital Biological Data -- 18.5 Ethical Education for Future Dual Use -- Author Biography -- References -- 19 Where Is the Governance of Dual-Use Science Going? 237 Nancy Connell and Gigi Gronvall -- 19.1 Background: Genetic Technologies and Their Applications -- 19.2 Dual-Use Science: Evolving Story of a Dualistic Term -- 19.3 Begin with the Experts: Models of Self-regulation -- 19.3.1 From Asilomar to Napa -- 19.3.2 Tools for Self-regulation: Risk and Benefit Analyses: Useful Frameworks -- 19.3.3 A Patchwork of Layered Oversight, from Global to Local -- 19.3.4 Self-regulation: The Basis of Scientific Enterprise -- 19.3.5 Oversight Along the Life Cycle of Research: Universities Are Sites of Layered Governance -- 19.3.6 Toward an International Model: International Collaboration in Science and Technology (ICST) -- 19.3.7 International Standards for Biosafety and Biosecurity -- 19.4 Alternative Governance Structures -- 19.4.1 Hybrid Governance Models -- 19.4.2 Network-Based Governance -- 19.4.3 Transnational Governance -- 19.5 Conclusion -- Author Biography -- References -- 20 Towards an International Biosecurity Education Network (IBSEN) 251 Kathryn Millett and Lijun Shang -- 20.1 Introduction -- 20.2 The Need for Biosecurity Education, Awareness-Raising and a Culture of Responsibility in the Life Sciences -- 20.3 Past Efforts in Educating Life Scientists and Establishing a Culture of Responsibility -- 20.4 Challenges Faced by Biosecurity Education and Awareness-Raising -- 20.5 Comparable Approaches Implemented in Analogous Frameworks in the Nuclear and Chemistry Fields -- 20.5.1 IAEA Nuclear Security Culture and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) -- 20.5.2 Chemical Weapons Convention and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) -- 20.5.3 Key Lessons from the INSEN and ABEO for an International Biosecurity Educational Network (IBSEN) -- 20.5.3.1 Comprehensive Understanding Learned from Related Initiatives -- 20.5.3.2 A Biosecurity Education Network Must Be Underpinned by Firm and Sustained Commitment from States and the Future Network's Host Body (Such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) -- 20.5.3.3 Sustained Financial Support Observed and Maintained -- 20.5.3.4 Strategic Vision and Clear Pathways Are Required for Communication and Collaboration Between a Network and Treaty Bodies/States -- 20.5.3.5 Diversity of Memberships and Engagement with a Wide Range of Stakeholders -- 20.6 Conclusion -- Author Biography -- References -- Appendix A: The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists -- Index.